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In this chapter an examination will be made in some detail of the Colombian th
attempt during 1965—66 to eliminate administrative controls over imports and
other transactions that entail purchases of foreign exchange. In earlier chap- a
ters I have already touched upon not only the Phase III episode itself but also
its background and its aftermath. Here I will highlight aspects of that experi- Cl
ence which have not been discussed earlier or which are particularly impor-
tant to an understanding of the reasons why, shortly after imports had been
almost fully liberalized, in October 1966, a return was announced, late the tht
next month, to the drastic import and exchange controls characteristic of d
Phase ii. c
In previous chapters some key relationships in the Colombian economy
were quantified that provide a useful framework for analyzing particular
cyclical situations. However, nothing has been done so far to quantify the lfl
dynamics of Colombian inflation, a quantification which is also part of the
necessary framework for short-run analysis. This Will be my first task in this
chapter. 1 will then proceed to discuss the relevant background to the 1965—66 1
liberalizationepisode, the episode itself, and its sweet-sour aftermath.
THE DYNAMICS OF INFLATION a
Ia
As in almost all countries, developed and developing, Colombian balance-of- to
payments policies have interacted with those in the monetary and fiscal fields, ot
which are aimed at obtaining steady growth near "full capacity" and without
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undue inflation. Programs for reducing the rate of inflation have been typically
accompanied in Colombia by policies to strengthen the balance of payments
and improve economic efficiency by reduced reliance on administrative con-
trols over imports or foreign-exchange transactions. Desirable policies, partic-
ularly regarding greater exchange-rate flexibility, have frequently been
avoided or attacked on grounds of their alleged inflationary impact. Itis
therefore important to obtain some idea about the major factors influencing
Colombian inflation, and about whether inflation during key cycles was more
or less "normal" in the sense of following patterns established for the whole
period.
The approach pioneered by Arnold C. Harberger in the study of inflation
dynamics' will be useful here. That approach uses multiple regression analysis
to explain percentage rates of change of different measures of the price level
as a function of rates of change in several other variables assumed to be
independent. The latter typically include measures of the money supply or
total banking credit, wages, the exchange rate, and real supplies. Alberto R.
Musalem has applied this technique for the Colombian case, with interesting
results.2 What follows builds on his work, although modifying it to better suit
an the purposes of this chapter and covering a different period.
This methodology has some weaknesses, mainly related to its reliance on
- asingle equation which assumes one-way causation from the independent
variables onto the dependent variable, the inflation rate. There have been
ri- circumstances in Colombia (as elsewhere) when monetary expansion could
have been said to accommodate rather than cause price increases, which may
en have originated in sectoral maladjustments or in the foreign sector. Under
he those conditions a failure to accommodate price increases would have led to
of declines in output rather than to a severe reduction of inflation. But the
construction of a simultaneous monetary model for Colombia is beyond the
scope of this work, and the results of the single-equation regressions may be
ar taken as little more than a descriptive summary of past links among the
he included variables, leaving the question of causation undecided. The best
he results obtained after considerable, but far from exhaustive, experimentation
are presented in Table 7-1. The basic data, sources, and elaborations are given
66 in the appendix to this chapter.
Note first that the dependent variables are quarterly percentage changes;
the money, wage, and supplies variables represent yearly changes; and the
import exchange rate represents a quarterly change also. The lagged money
and supplies variables represent nonoverlapping yearly changes, and the
lagged exchange-rate variable represents a quarterly change. In other words,
of- to explain, say, the change in the cost-of-living index between the first quarter
• of 1958 and the last quarter of 1957, the relevant regression uses both the




































Regressions for Quarterly Percentage Increases in Colombian Price Levels, 1958—69















Money plus quasi money (yearly 0.08 0.08 0.01
change) (1.22) (1.75) (0.15)
Lagged money plus quasi money 0.02 0.05 0.10
. (0.37) (1.03) (2.59)
Average import exchange rate 0.08 0.08 0.11
(quarterly change) (1.52) (2.24) (3.32)
Lagged average import exchange 0.13 0.13 0.12
rate (2.45) (3.50) (3.96)
Wage rates (yearly change) 0.19 0.12 0.05
, (4.60) (4.16) (2.20)






























R2 0.75 0.72 0.71
DW statistic 1.97 1.42 1.71
F statistic 10.98 9.71 9.12
SouRcE: See appendix to thischapter.
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first quarter of 1957 and the change in the same variable between the first
quarter of 1957 and the first quarter of 1956. It also uses both the change in the
import exchange rate between the first quarter of 1958 and the last quarter of
1957 and the change for that variable between the last and the third quarter of
LT
1957.It is not surprising that the different independent variables show varying
lex lag structures; further experimentation would probably yield even greater
differentiation.
ifs The variables are mostly self-explanatory. Money plus quasi money
workedbetter than just money or total credit. The wage rates refer to average
hourly money wage rates in manufacturing. The real supplies variable is
somewhat unusual, as it includes only merchandise imports plus agricultural
and livestock output excluding coffee. The combination of these two strategic
) supply sources performed better in the regressions than others relying on
more aggregated variables, such as the gross domestic product.
The fits are sufficiently good for our purposes, even though the regres-
sions do not attempt to take into account expectation variables. Trends in the
world price level are also ignored, with some justification for the period
analyzed. As in the Musalem results, the story told does not support either
extreme "monetarist"3 or extreme "structuralist" explanations of the Colom-
bian inflation. The regressions also show that changes in the import exchange
rate do significantly influence changes in the price level. That influence is also
quick (yearly changes for the exchange rate performed much worse than the
quarterly ones) and quantitatively important. A 10 per cent devaluation would
be expected to increase prices by about 2 per cent, ceteris paribus, according
to these equations. It is noteworthy that when the 1956—58 period is included
in the regressions, the importance of the exchange-rate variable declines. For
reasons that are not completely clear,4 the very large devaluations of those
years affected the price level less than devaluations of later years. At any rate,
even the 1958—69 results show that the extreme claims often heard in Colom-
bia, which imply a value of 1.0 for the sum of the exchange-rate coefficients,
are exaggerated. The combination of short lags for the price effects of devalua-
tions, somewhat longer ones for wage-rate changes, and much longer (and less
) clear) ones for money, in turn influenced by fiscal and monetary policies,
suggests an explanation for the popular but exaggerated identification of
devaluations with inflation.
A clearer idea of the results presented in Table 7-1 may be obtained by
asking what would be the net impact on the price level of a 10 per cent
devaluation and a policy of liberalization that resulted in a permanent rise in
imports also of 10 per cent, ceteris paribus. In the accompanying tabulation of
the time proffle of price changes (in percentages), each of the coefficients in
Table 7-1 is taken at its face value; it is assumed (realistically) that imports188 THE 1965—66LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
make up 40 per cent of the real supplies variable; and devaluation and bel





Cost-of-Living Wholesale Price Excl. for
Quarter Index Index Foodstuffs
1 0.68 0.64 0.86 en
II 1.18 1.14 0.96 for
III —0.12 —0.16 —0.24 prf
IV —0.12 —0.16 —0.24 up
V 0.04 —0.04 —0.12 Co
VI 0.04 —0.04 —0.12 in
VII 0.04 —0.04 —0.12
$1
VIII 0.04 —0.04 —0.12
d IX 0 0 0 Uf
If each of the price indices shown stood at 100 before devaluation plus
91
ml liberalization, by the time the lagged effects had worked through the system
(the ninth quarter), they would stand at 101.8, 101.3, and 100.9. Thus, the
ne
assumed import liberalization would not be sufficient to offset the price
increases generated by the exchange-rate changes. According to the regres-
sion for the wholesale price index excluding foodstuffs, in which supplies have
bi the most potent deflationary effect,it would take a sustained increase in
imports of about 16 per cent to offset the inflationary impact of a 10 per cent
devaluation by the ninth quarter. Even in this case the time profile, with early
price increases and later declines, may mislead some into regarding the whole
package as inflationary. ef
ac
tic
THE 1962 DEVALUATION: REVIEW OF SOME raIi
BACKGROUND
It will be recalled that the severe balance-of-payments crisis faced by Colom-
bia after the collapse of the coffee boom of 1954—56 was handled by a Ott
combination of a sharp devaluation, tightened import controls, and implemen- eli
tation of austere fiscal and monetary policies. Between the first quarter of 1957
and the first quarter of 1959, the average import exchange rate rose by a
remarkable 175 per cent, while money plus quasi money rose by a modest 23 av
per cent. Money wage rates, in turn, rose by 29 per cent. Thanks to the ce
spartan fiscal, monetary, and wage policies, price increases were kept far th
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i d below exchange-rate variations, yielding a substantial change in relative
prices. The percentage increases in prices from the first quarter of 1957 to the
first quarter of 1959 were as follows: cost of living, + 32.4; wholesale price
index, +31.9; and wholesale price index, excluding foodstuffs, +36.3.
It is worth remembering that while Colombia's stabilization effort was
regarded sympathetically by foreign creditors, in those years there were no
foreign credit facilities as flexible as the "program loans" available after 1961,
nor access to Eurocredits as during the early 1970s. A good deal of civic
enthusiasm, which now (middle 1970s) looks almost naive, more than made up
for the scarcity of foreign assistance. The debt problem at that time involved
primarily short-term suppliers' credits, which could be expected to be cleared
up by a vigorous once-and-for-all effort. For the period 1957—60, changes in
Colombian gross foreign-exchange reserves very closely followed movements
in the balance of the merchandise trade account, which after a deficit of U.S.
$106 million in 1956, yielded an accumulated surplus of U.S. $147 million
during the three years 1957—59,inspite of the fall in coffee prices.
By 1959 there was an eagerness to resume a faster pace of growth; real
GDP during 1958 was less than 5percent above that reached in 1956,
?111s indicating a fall in per capita product. Merchandise imports during 1958 were
tern nearly 40 per cent below the 1956 levels. Inevitably, development-minded
the Colombians pressed for more expansive public policies. The new chapter
rice (volume?) in inter-American relations that started with the triumph of the
res- Cuban revolution had just been opened, and there were high hopes in Colom-
ave bia for a large amount of aid from the United States.
in It has been noted that, in spite of the substantial increase in the real
ent import exchange rate between 1956 and 1959,administrativecontrols over
any imports were strengthened. In January 1959, in fact, a new law institutional-
iole ized the revised controls. In May 1959 a new customs tariff was also put into
effect, intended to capture for the public treasury some of the premiums
accruing to receivers of import licenses. The new tariff also included protec-
tionist features. During 1957 and most of 1958 an essentially flexible exchange-
rate policy was followed. However, after about August 1958, the certificate
import rate was kept at 6.4 pesos per dollar, while the "free" rate fluctuated
slightly around 8 pesos, as many influential voices called for "consolidating"
om- monetary stability by adopting less flexible exchange rates. Indeed, as a result
y a of changes in the average mix of certificate and free rates charged to import-
ers, the average de facto import exchange rate appreciatedbyalmost 8 per
1957 cent in the first quarter of 1959 compared with the second quarter of 1958.
y a By the end of 1959 this premature consolidation and appreciation of the
a23 average nominal import exchange rate had carried it to the level of the pegged
the certificate rate, 6.4 pesos. The expansionary fiscal and monetary policies were
far thus launched just as the import rate was being pegged.
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Much to his credit the then Minister of the Treasury, Hernando Agudelo
Villa, quickly saw the dangers of that combination, and during March 1960 he th 1
and his colleagues began experimenting with what later was to be called a UI
"crawling peg," moving the certificate rate by less than 5 per cent to 6.7
pesos. Unfortunately, this wise policy was met by heavy opposition, particu- in
larly from the then Senator Carlos Lieras Restrepo, who, ironically, was to
institutionalize the "crawling peg," under his presidency during 1967. He was th
already regarded as the Liberal politician most knowledgeable in economics,
and had been the main author of Law 1 of 1959, institutionalizing the new
import and exchange-control system. In a remarkable and friendly debate, on R
April 4, 1960, Lieras Restrepo and Agudelo Villa discussed this and other
aspects of the government's economic policies.5 ir
Lleras Restrepo challenged the notion that large imports during the first m
quarter of 1960 indicated the need for further devaluations. He warned against
unifying the certificate and "free" rates by raising the certificate rate to the in
level of the latter (which was then only about 6.9 pesos), and said such action th
would be "incomprehensible." Hardly mentioning minor exports,he N
expressed the fear that the new policy would lead to gradual devaluations
which would grow"... asthe poet Jorge Rojas says, more or less insensibly, ui
like the roses."
The reply by Agudelo Villa reads on the whole quite well, particularly in in
light of what came later. But politically the debate was finished after the Lleras
blast. The certificate rate was to remain at 6.7 pesos until November 1962,
when alter much fruitless and wasteful resistance it was raised by more than tii
34 per cent to a new pegged level of 9 pesos. Proposals for greater flexibility
were again rejected. P
e
c
THE IMPACT OF THE 1962 DEVALUATION
e
The failure of the policies adopted in November 1962, early in the presidency
q
of Leon Valencia, to achieve their objectives can be easily summarized by the G following indicators, showing percentage increases between the third quarter
of 1962 and the third quarter of 1963:
Cost of living 35.4
Wholesaleprice index 29.9
Wholesale price index, excluding foodstuffs 27.0
Average nominal import exchange rate 34.3
CI
Money plus quasi money 21.0 ei
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elo The price level increased roughly in the same proportion as the nominal
he devaluation, in sharp contrast to the 1957—59 experience. Based on this
i a unfortunate incident many in Colombia reached the conclusion that devalua-
6 7 tion "could not work." It may be worthwhile to look with greater detail at this
inflationary episode, using the regressions developed in Table 7-1.
to Table 7-2containsactual and predicted quarterly price changes from 1960
through 1964; the predictions are from the regressions in Table 7-1. It may be
cs seen, first of all, that the period from 1960 through 1962 was one of relative
price stability, in spite of the more expansionary policies adopted since 1959.
Real GDP rose by 4.3, 5.1, and 5.4 per cent in 1960, 1961, and 1962,
-her respectively. Note, however, that by 1962 all three regressions were törecast-
ing higher-than-realized rates of inflation; that was the year when attempts to
maintain the 6.7 pesos rate became most intense.
When devaluation came in November 1962, the inflationary burst, follow-
the ing an apparently mild price response in December 1962, was concentrated in
•ion the first half of 1963, after which the rate of price increase declined sharply.
he Note that most, but not all, of that price explosion is predicted by our
"normal" regressions. For the whole of 1963 the regressions still slightly
•)ly, underestimate the actual increase in the price level.
A rough indication of the explained and unexplained sources of the
in inflationary burst of the first half of 1963 is given by Table 7-3, in which
ras predicted price increases are decomposed according to the current and lagged
62, values of the independent variables. The three equations yield similar predic-
han tions of the amount of absolute inflation to be expected from the change in the
lity nominal import exchange rate, all failing within a range of inflation of 6. Ito 6.5
per cent (the higher share in Table 7-3 for the inflationary contribution of the
exchange rate to the increase in wholesale prices excluding foodstuffs is partly
compensated by the lower inflation rate shown by that index). Clearly, other
factors aggravated the inflationary pressure, although for wages and monetary
expansions (particularly the former) the different regressions yield different
quantitative estimates.
During both 1961 and 1962 government expenditures rose relative to
C GNP; the sum of all current expenditures of the general government plus er public fixed capital formation rose from 10.4 per cent of GNP during 1960 to
11.7 per cent in 1961 and to 12.3 per cent during 1962. Current revenues of the
national government, which in 1960 were 95 per cent of expenditures, fell to 77
per cent of expenditures in 1961 and to 72 per cent in 1962. Net banking credit
to the government, which at the end of 1960 represented 20 per cent of all
credit, accounted for 33 per cent of the increase in all such credit between the
end of 1960 and the end of 1962. The deficit financed by net banking credit
amounted to 0.7 per cent of GNP in 1961 and 2.2 per cent in 1962.6 In the192 THE 1965—66LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
TABLE 7-2
Actual (A) and Predicted(P)Quarterly Changes in Colombian Price Level, 1960—64


















































































































S4 Share of Actual Increases in Price Level During First and Second Quarters of 1963
"Explained" by Variables in Regressions of Table 7-1














Cost-of-Living Wholesale Price Excluding
Index Index Foodstuffs
Money plus quasi money 12.3 18.3 21.6
Import exchange rate 22.4 25.8 31.0
Wage rates 53.8 38.9 20.1
Real supplies 2.5 2.3 2.6




inflation 87.8 78.1 74.1
Actual inflation (sum of
first and second





22) SOURCE: Table 7-I.
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context of weak monetary policy tools, described in earlier chapters, such
fiscal policy was a key factor in the expansion of 42 per cent registered in
money and quasi money between the last quarter of 1960 and the last quarter
of 1962.
A legitimate preoccupation at a time of devaluation is how much the
burden of adjustment will fall on the employed working class via decreases in
real wages. Our wage rate series shows an upward trend in real wage rates
(nominal rates deflated by the cost-of-living index) throughout 1960, 1961, and
1962. In spite of the devaluation, the upward trend continued during the early
months of 1963. For the whole of 1963, real wage rates were 7 per cent above
those for 1962, although toward the end of 1963 a downward tendency was
visible, which continued in 1964. For the whole of 1964, real wages were 3 per
cent below those of 1963, and about 2 per cent above those of 1962. Public
policy, under intense trade union and political pressure, had something to do
with at least the timing of these movements.














4.194 THE 1965—66 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
Early in the discussions about a new devaluation, the government had
pledged to raise wages. Wages were in fact increased abruptly by a national u
law during the first quarter of 1963, with Congress going beyond the wage d
concessions suggested by the executive. The quarterly percentage changes in a
nominal hourly wages during 1962 and 1963 evolved as follows:
gi
1962 I 2.1 1963 I 14.1 b
II 4.1 II 12.4
III 5.0 III 2.4 th
IV 7.1 IV 3.0
in
The wage legislation also provided for an escalator clause, which was later
abandoned with the apparent approval of the trade unions.
According to our regressions, declines in real supplies during early 1963 tc
contributed (slightly) to the inflationary burst. Import licensing had been ei
severely restricted during late 1962. As a result, during the first half of 1963 the ol
dollar value of merchandise imports was 20 per cent below the corresponding
period in the previous year. The noncoffee rural GDP practically stagnated (it b
rose by 0.7 per cent) between 1962 and 1963 because of bad weather, thus
decreasing per capita agricultural supplies. It is quite possible that our clumsy w
way of taking into account rural real supplies leads to an underestimation of a]
the inflationary impact of declines in supplies during early 1963. Real GDP as a a
whole rose between 1962 and 1963 by 3.3 per cent, only slightly faster than d
population growth. a
It should be added that many have reported weather as being unfavorable 1
during early 1963, and that hurt mainly the output of key foodstuffs.7 b
As noted in Table 7-3, the actual inflationary burst went beyond that ti
predicted by the regressions. One may speculate as to the reasons for this
overshooting. A first consideration, totally ignored in the regressions, is the
timing of changes in a host of government-regulated prices not only for 1
electricity and public transportation but also for a number of "basic necessi- (
ties" (milk, sugar, cigarettes) ordinarily subject to price controls and other
agricultural commodities for which minimum prices are ordinarily set. During 1
1962 the government held a strict line on these prices, which may partly (
explain the size of the residuals of the regressions for 1962. Right after the c
devaluation, and under advice from international lenders, most of these prices t.
were abruptly readjusted upward. Early in 1963, for example, public transpor- e
tation fares were increased between 50 and 75 per cent; and gasoline prices, by a
20 per cent; and price ceilings on cement, cigarettes, milk, and sugar went up
between 15 and 20 per cent. I"

























ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 195
the manner in which the government went about the devaluation. As is not
unusual when it comes to moving an adjustable peg, before the November 20
decision there was considerable discussion of the forthcoming devaluation,
and a clear signal of what was to come was given on November 7, when all
imports were temporarily placed on the prohibited list. A politically weak
government publicly discussed options as to whether and how to devalue,
before November 20, adding to the climate of uncertainty and speculation.
While the regressions take into account changes in monetary conditions,
the peculiar way in which money plus quasi money expanded late in 1962, at
the time of devaluation, may have had greater-than-average inflationary
impact because of the expectations it generated. Beginning in November 1962,
as part of its agreement with the IMF, the government liquidated its sizable
floating debt with domestic creditors by using bank credit. As a result, of the
total net increase in money plus quasi money between the end of 1961 and the
end of 1962, an astounding 78 per cent took place during the last two months
of 1962. In other words, while money plus quasi money rose by 5.3percent
between December 31, 1961, and October 31, 1962, it rose by 17.4 per cent
between the latter date and the end of 1962.
After this sketchy review of the 1962 devaluation it can easily be seen
why memories of its impact were a major obstacle facing those attempting
after that date to use a more flexible exchange rate as a policy tool. The
argument that that event was a textbook example of how not to manage a
devaluation made little impression. The feelings of most Colombians were
accurately reflected by the then President Leon Valencia, who throughout
1963 and 1964 would warn his economic advisers not to mention the abomina-
ble wordhis presence, in spite of continuing balance-of-payments difficul-
ties.
THE 1965-66 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE:
ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION
The years 1963 and 1964 were melancholy ones for foreign trade policy in
Colombia. The nominal import exchange rate was pegged and obviously
overvalued once again, while that for minor exports, one peso higher, shared
those two features (until the last quarter of 1964). Not surprisingly, foreign-
exchange difficulties continued to plague the economy, while real GDP grew
at an average rate of only 4.3 per cent per year during 1963, 1964, and 1965.
In the new cycle following the devaluation of the basic import rate in
November 1962, the expected relaxation of import controls did not last long
because that stabilization program failed significantly to change relative
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prices. The prestige of licensing as the tool to repress imports rose as that of
exchange-rate devaluation sank. Imports on the free list as a share of total fr4
registered imports fell from 60 per cent in 1960—61 to about 35 per cent in late of
1964 and lower still in early 1965. The time taken to decide on import requests
• lengthened, and during the last half of 1964 it reached, on average, nearly
three months. Prior import deposits were kept in the central bank longer than
usual, often for more than ten months. By late 1964 about 35 per cent of
all license applications were being refused, and bitter and severe criticisms
were again levied at beleaguered import control authorities. In December se
1964 the free list was suspended, at first for 90 days, but then until Sep- ex
tember 1965, and prior exchange registration was made more difficult, re-
sulting in a new piling up of commercial arrears. Early in 1965 prohibitions In
were extended, and licensing became increasingly slow and difficult, particu- lic
larly for capital goods. Fresh attempts were made to divert both private and ti
official imports toward bilateral partners, particularly with capital goods such
as agricultural and construction machinery, elevators, tractors, trucks, and rn
other vehicles. Some Colombian trading partners that felt injured by these ca
practices, particularly the United States and the West German Federal Repub- th
lic, made their displeasure known directly and indirectly, of
Throughout 1964 the draining of exchange reserves for supporting the pe
"free rate" at 10 pesos per U.S. dollar became more burdensome. It will be
recalled that the rate for minor exports was pegged at that 10-peso level right
after the November 1962 devaluation of the certificate import rate, under the th
pressing advice of the IMF, among others. Indeed, and quite incredibly when
viewed in retrospect, the IMF urged at that time and throughout 1963 that the pi
rates should be unified at 9 pesos, arguing that the 10-peso rate gave minor m
exports a privileged position and an unjustified subsidy, while generating
inflationary pressures! It should be noted that at that time some Colombian th
officials in the executive branch apparently agreed with the IMF, but tried to e
blame Congress for the higher rate legislated for minor exports. As can be
seen in Table 2-10, during 1963 the net real exchange rate applied to minor w
exports was below both what it had been in 1962 and what it was to be in 1970;
the 1962 and 1970 rates were 15 per cent higher than the 1963 rate. As can be Jul
seen,in turn, in Table 4-7, the nominal purchasing-power-parity exchange rate
applied to imports in 1958 was 24 per cent above that for 1963, while the 1970 o
rate exceeded it by 22 per cent. C
Most cautiously, late in 1964 members of the Junta Monetaria began
hinting to an embattled President the need to reconsider exchange-rate policy. e
At that time the President was troubled not only by memories of the 1962 al
devaluation, but also by a very serious political situation, which included ce
rumors of an imminent coup d'etat. Devaluation advice was severely rebuffed. all
Nevertheless, in October 1964 the central bank stopped supporting the pegged grORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 197
free rate, apparently then less politically sensitive than the certificate rate. The
free rate depreciated quickly and more or less steadily, going from an average
of 10 pesos in October 1964 to a high of 19.2 pesos in August 1965. By late
1964 the IMF was also advising devaluation, and had given up at last its
opposition to a dual system including a higher rate for minor exports.
While during the second and third quarters of 1965 the purchasing-power-
parity effective exchange rate applied to minor exports reached, thanks to the
freeing of the "free"rate,8 high levels not reached either before or after, by the
second quarter of that year the purchasing-power-parity nominal import
exchange rate fell to its lowest point since early 1957. At that time, the rate
was about one-third below the (almost identical) averages for 1958 and 1970.
Import control administrators recall with horror the chaotic conditions of
licensing during the first six months of 1965; delays and rejections of applica-
tions were at levels not seen since 1956—57. During April 1965, for example,
average delays in handling import requests were said to have reached six
months. The zooming free-market rate reflected widespread speculation and
capital flight, also stimulated by severe political unrest. At this time, however,
the increase in the price level was not particularly severe; in the third quarter
of 1965, the cost-of-living index was 4 per cent above its level in the same
period in 1964. The corresponding figure for the wholesale price index was 8
per cent; for the index excluding foodstuffs, the increase was 11 per cent.
At the end of June 1965, gross foreign-exchange reserves were down to
their lowest levels since 1957, and were, at $56 million, only a little more than
half of what they had been a year earlier. In that climate, both official and
public attention first focused on the wild goings-on in the free exchange
market. At the end of June 1965, in a controversial move allegedly motivated
by fears of inflation, the rate applicable to minor exports was divorced from
the free rate and set at 13.5 pesos, representing a sharp appreciation for minor
exporters. The inflation argument was related to the obligation of the central
bank to buy dollars earned by minor exports at the rate ruling the previous
week in the free market to cover its commitment to importers in the certificate
market. The loss from buying dollars at 18.8 pesos (the average free rate in
June 1965) and selling them at 9 pesos was covered by simply printing pesos.
This move, at a time when the need to stimulate new exports was obvious, can
only be understood in terms of the severe political constraints under which
economic policymakers operated and the weakness of monetary policy tools.
Perhaps the best thing that can be said for the 13.5-peso rate for minor
exports is that, once it was created, it provided a "plausible" and sound
alternative to both the 9-peso certificate rate (note that it was exactly 50 per
cent higher) and the eye-catching but thin free market. As noted in Chapter 1,
allegedly the President was finally persuaded to go along with the de facto


































with the import liberalization program in September 1965, by the argument pe
that relative to the free-market rate the move toward a rate of 13.5 pesos was
really a revaluation which would also bring down the free rate. The fixation of
19(
public opinion with the antics of the free rate had become so intense that one Co
cannot be sure whether the acceptance of that thesis represented economic vir
wishful thinking or the wiles of a subtle politician with a short-term horizon. In de1
fact, between August and October 1965 the free rate appreciated from 19.2
pesos to 17.8 pesos. the
On September 2, 1965, following the advice of the Junta Monetana, the 13
certificate market was divided into a preferential and an intermediate section, m
with rates of 9 and 13.5 pesos, respectively. The preferential group included
commodities such as foodstuffs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Imports in
were to be transferred gradually from the first to the second section, with the Sei
less "essential" imports going first, while simultaneously freeing them from
administrative controls. Capital goods were also quickly placed in the interme-
diate market, on the grounds that payments on such imports are spread out tha
over a period of time. wit
The original liberalization plan called for removal of prior licensing on the
about half of all imports within six months, and eventually including 65 per sur
cent of all imports. It was expected that imports of capital goods for industrial SW
plants would be kept under control as part of the mechanism for investment lib
planning.9 In fact, the pace of liberalization went even faster. The free list was
expanded on each of the following dates: September 8, November 11, 1965; tio
January 27, February 22, February 28, March 17, July 29, and August 21, de
1966. By this last date nearly all imports had been reclassified to the intermedi- be
ate exchange rate; most imports were now either prohibited or on the free list,
although some remained subject to prior licensing. Furthermore, starting in all
October 1965, advance import deposits were reduced every month by 5 (n4
percentage points from the rates in force on September 30. The plan called for qu
continuing this rhythm for twenty months until those deposits were elimi- 19
nated. In late August 1966, however, it was announced that the 5 per cent cuts th
were to be made quarterly, not monthly, starting in November 1966. It will be
recalled that between September 1965 and August 1966 numerous modifica-
tions, mainly upward, were also introduced in the tariff, in principle to
harmonize it with import liberalization. The temporary maintenance of a sh
prohibited list was justified primarily on protectionist grounds. Of all regis-
tered imports during 1965 only 15 per cent had been on the free list; the
corresponding figure for 1966 was 56 per cent. By October 1966 the free list wi
covered 80 per cent of all registered imports. inc
Because of the lack of candor and clarity with which the liberalization
plan was launched, a number of points remained ambiguous, and were to
haunt policymakers a year later. In particular, the issue of raising the 13.5- eqiORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 199
ent peso rate was left fuzzy. In September 1965 such fuzziness on future devalua-
tion was used to sell the package and avoid inflationary expectation, as in
iof 1963; but by September 1966 this was to become a source of irritation between
me Colombians and international creditors. Among the latter, some were con-
nic vinced in 1965 that Colombian authorities had committed themselves to
In depreciating the intermediate rate if necessary, in line with a policy of
9.2 exchange flexibility, rather than stop or reverse import liberalization. In fact,
they expected such further devaluations to be necessary, suspecting that the
the 13.5-peso rate was too low. Other architects and sponsors of the plan, one
on, may speculate, probably assumed that import liberalization would inevitably
Jed drag the authorities, unable to reverse liberalization, into further devaluations
)rts in the future whether or not they were willing to consider such a possibility in
the September 1965. By this time, it should be noted, the Monetary Board had
pm been given the power to make exchange-rate adjustments at any time and of
ne- any size. The free rate was still allowed to fluctuate freely, and some hoped
out that eventually an upward crawling intermediate rate would reach and merge
with the free rate. The progressive liberalization of import controls would test
• on the appropriateness of the 13.5-peso rate, which was to be raised if the import
per surge proved to be too great. A species of "chicken" game was set up. On
xial such shaky foundations was based the most systematic attempt at import
rent liberalization attempted in Colombia since World War II.
was Regardless of how a 13.5-peso rate looked in September 1965, the infla-
)65; tionary burst of late 1965 and the first half of 1966 robbed the gradual nominal
21, devaluation of a good share of its real effect, although matters were much
edi- better in this respect than following the 1962 devaluation. By the time the new
list, President, Carlos Lieras Restrepo, assumed office, in August 1966, virtually
lfl all import payments were being made at 13.5 pesos per dollar and nearly all
Y 5 (nonprohibited) imports were on the free list. The price level during the third
•for quarter of 1966 was, however, substantially above that for the third quarter of
1965 (21 per cent according to the cost-of-living index, 17 per cent according to
the wholesale price index, and 19 per cent according to the index of wholesale
1 be prices excluding foodstuffs).
Changes for 1965—69 in the actual price level and as predicted by the
to regressions of Table 7-1 are shown in Table 7-4. It may be seen that there were
•)f a sharp price increases in the last quarter of 1965 and the first half of 1966, which
gis- were, however, quite "normal" in the sense that they were predicted to a very
-the large extent by the regressions. This may be more clearly seen in Table 7-5, in
list which also shares of the observed inflation are attributed to the different
independent variables according to their coefficients and concurrent and
•lion lagged actual changes.
e to As in the predictions for the first half of 1963, the three regression
equations forecast similar absolute inflation rates—7.6, 7.6, and 8.1 per cent—200 THE1965—66LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
Contrary to the case of the 1962 devaluation, national government
finances do not appear to have been the major culprit for the hefty rates of d
TABLE 7-4
Actual(A) andPredicted (P) Quarterly Changes in Colombian Price Level,1965—69





















































































































stemming from the change in the average import exchange rate, most of which
occurred during the last quarter of 1965. Inflationary monetary factors appear
more important than for the first half of 1963, while increases in nominal wage
rates are less so.ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 201
Share of Actual Increases in Price Level During Last Quarter of 1965 and First Half of
1966 "Explained" by Variables in Regressions of Table 7-1




















Cost-of-Living Wholesale Price Excluding
Index Index Foodstuffs
Money plus quasi
money 27.4 45.0 44.2
Import exchange rate 35.1 47.2 56.2
Wage rates 36.2 30.5 15.3
Real supplies —3.2 —4.4 —5.7




inflation 78.0 93.8 102.9
Actual inflation (sum of
three quarters) 21.6 16.0 14.4
2.29) SOURCE: Table 7-1.
2.17
expansion in money and quasi money observed in late 1965 and early 1966.
Current revenues accounted for 87 per cent of government expenditures in
1964 and for 91 per cent in 1965. As liberalized imports rose, custom revenues
(particularly from duties on autos) expanded sharply, and during 1966 the
central budget showed a small surplus. Monetary expansion, which during the
first quarter of 1966 ran 19 per cent above a year earlier, can be blamed
primarily on the imperfect tools available to the monetary authorities for
restraining banking credit to the private sector. Such imperfection arose in
part from the power of private banks practically to ignore reserve require-
ments imposed by the central bank.1° It also includes the power of the Coffee
Growers' Federation to obtain credit and the effects of a coffee policy
encouraging such pressures. During 1966 while the domestic coffee price was
fi.xed, the dollar price was falling. This, together with a good crop and the
desire to withhold some of it to prop up the dollar price, led to credit demands
that the lame-duck Valencia government was unable to resist.
Increases in money wage rates were not encouraged by public policy


















declined by 4 per cent between the first three quarters of 1965 and the 2
following three quarters, in spite of rising imports and output. if the first three t
quarters of 1965 are compared with those of 1966, a decline of 5.5 per cent is t
observed in real wage rates. No wonder that the abrupt death of the liberaliza-
tion episode in November 1966 evoked few tears from the working class.
Seasonal factors were more favorable than in 1963, and the effect of
changes in real supplies was to dampen inflation, contrary to its behavior in
the previous major devaluation. As may be seen in Table 3-3, merchandise
imports reacted vigorously to the liberalization beginning in the first quarter of r
1966; during the first half of that year the dollar value of imports was 30 per o
cent higher than the corresponding value for the same period in 1965, and 43 1
per cent higher than during the second half of 1965. Noncoffee rural output
rose by 2.8 per cent in 1965 and by 3.9 per cent in 1966, figures not far from
normal trends.t' Over-all real GDP was expanding during 1966 at higher-than-
trend rates, finishing that year with a 5.4 per cent increase over 1965.
During 1965—66 the large gap between the free-market rate and the rate
applicable to merchandise imports was blamed by some for creating expecta-
tions contributing to inflation. As shown in Table 7-5, that gap is unnecessary
to behavior of wholesale prices. Its contribution to increases in the
cost of living is also doubtful: a variable showing the ratio of the two exchange
rates during 1958—69 was found insignificant in regressions of the type shown s
inTable7-1. 0
In August 1966 it appeared that the liberalization program was firmly
established. The new President had pledged to continue it and early in his t
administration, on August 21, 1966, took measures to complete the transfer of r
imports from the 9- to the 13.5-peso rate. The import surge was expected to g
abate once pent-up import demand had spent itself. According to the price a
dynamics of Table 7-1, the most inflationary phase of the devaluation-liberali-
zation episode had been passed, and a net deflationary effect could be s
expected from the current and lagged effects of the expansion of real sup- e
plies, driven mainly by the import surge. Thus, taking the regression for the (
wholesale price index (excluding foodstuffs) of Table 7-i, the net percentage e
effect on price changes of the observed movements in the exchange rate and 2
real supplies variables was as follows: 19651V, +4.25; 19661, +3.34; 196611, t
—0.34; 1966111, —0.80; and 19661V, —0.49. C
r
BLOWUP , t
As already noted, back in September 1965 it was the understanding of the IMF c
(and some others) that if the balance-of-payments situation remained precar-
ious after the transfer to the 13.5 peso rate had been completed, further eBLOWUP 203
adjustments would be made in the exchange rate. It was further understood by
the IMF that the Colombian government had agreed, in its "letter of inten-
is tion" of 1965, to use quarterly targets in gross foreign-exchange reserves as
a- objective indicators of the state of the balance of payments which would, if not
met, trigger automatic devaluations. At the end of September 1966 the reserve
of target was not met. Indeed, Colombian net reserves were deep in the red.
in During the first three quarters of 1966, merchandise imports (dollar c.i.f.
se values) had run at 44 per cent above the corresponding period for 1965, while
of registered merchandise exports had declined slightly (by 1 per cent). The export
er outlook was not very promising; coffee prices had been declining since April
43 1966 and minor exports were sluggish and certainly below trend. For the
Ut whole of 1966 the change relative to 1965 was as follows:
m
Merchandise imports (dollars, c.i.f.): 48.7%
Recorded merchandise exports (dollars): —5.8
Coffee exports (dollars) —4.5
a- Registered minor exports (dollars): —-1.6
ry Crude petroleum exports (dollars): —20.0
ge Gross foreign-exchange reserves at the end of the third quarter of 1966
vn stood at $52 million, or $11 million less than a year earlier, and represented
only 8 per cent of 1966 imports.
Under these circumstances the IMF pressed for an immediate devalua-
us tion as a condition for releasing the last credit tranche of the standby agree-
,,of ment signed in 1965 and renewing the standby agreement. The Colombian
to government, i.e., primarily President Lleras and his Minister of the Treasury,
argued that such a move was not necessary at that time. Among younger
Ii- government economists and technicians opposition to devaluation was not as
strong. Indeed, some members of that group had argued for devaluation since
early September, before the IMF recommended such a move. The higher
Colombian authorities argued that both the fall in coffee and in minor export
earnings reflected basically exogenous declines in world commodity prices
and were to blame for the failure to achieve the reserve target. In particular,
[I, the link between the poor performance of minor exports in 1966 and the
decline in the real minor export exchange rate between 1965 and 1966 was
rejected. The government also insisted that the import surge had peaked and
that a decline in imports could be expected. It pointed out that the liberaliza-
tion program had been carried out at a faster pace than had been agreed in
1965. It rejected the idea of rigidly linking exchange-rate movements to
[F changes in the reserve situation, using arguments similar to those used by the
French in the 1973 discussions of international monetary reform. It denied that
er either explicitly or implicitly a commitment had been made to that notion in204 THE 1965—66 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
September 1965, a denial supported by Colombian officials who participated in a
those negotiations. The government went on to say that the circumstances
called not for devaluation, but for an expanded volume of concessionary aid
flows to Colombia to support the liberalization program during those difficult
circumstances. The critical breathing space to be purchased by aid referred
not only to that needed to face allegedly temporary balance-of-payments (
difficulties, but also that required by the new government (inaugurated in a
August 1966) to get a firm hold on domestic policy tools, particularly monetary
OflCS. a
The new government was very eager not to repeat the performance of
that other new administration which four years before, in November 1962, had
undertaken a devaluation under pressure from the IMF and aid-granting
organizations. Indeed, the new President was very conscious that, whether
justly or not, he was being attacked as having been one of the key architects of
the 1962 devaluation.
In October and November 1966, there was intense shuttling of national
and international civil servants between Washington and Bogota. The Colom-
bian government hoped that the IMF did not represent the position of other
credit institutions, such as the IBRD and AID. It also argued that it did not
necessarily oppose the idea of eventual devaluations; it simply did not regard f'-
October1966 as the right time. It noted that it had no intention of freezing the
free market, then used mainly for capital and some "invisible" transactions
(as well as smuggling), and which stood at about 16.4 pesos in September
1966, below the rates of a year earlier. It reaffirmed its intention of making
sure that fiscal and monetary policies were under control and noninflationary
beforefurtherdevaluing the certificate rate. cI
The leverage which foreign aid agencies could exert on the Colombian
government was still substantial in 1966. As already noted, Colombian for-
eign-exchange reserves were particularly low. The Colombian foreign debt,
while not reaching the extraordinary levels of some other less developed *
countries,had been rising. Interest and amortization on that debt amounted to
12 per cent of exports of goods and nonfactor services in 1962; by 1966 that
debt burden indicator had increased to more than 16 per cent.'2 It will be
recalled that at that time the Washington aid agencies as a group had a virtual
monopoly of medium- and long-term credit vis-à-vis countries such as Colom-
bia, not only because of the flows they controlled directly but also because of
the strong influence theirjudgments had on U.S. and European private banks.
The competitive forces and new options generated by the Eurocurrency
market were still in their infancy. Faced by a liquidity crunch, Colombia had
either to give in to the combined aid agencies or take drastic austerity
measures.
Things came to head late in November. apparently triggered by theSISYPHUS AND LAW 444 205
in announcement of AID and the IBRD to Colombian officials that their aid
es would be conditioned on a Colombian agreement with the IMF. including firm
Lid commitments to a devaluation timetable. The IMF-AID-IBRD group charged
ult that the Colombian government lacked a balance-of-payments policy, and said
ed that under those conditions they could not go on lending money to it. The
Colombian government claimed to have been surprised by this collusion
in among foreign creditors and acted decisively. The apparently new AID posi-
.ry tion was first heard by Colombian officials on November 27 (a Sunday), and
again the next day, together with that of the IBRD. A cabinet meeting showed
of most younger economists in favor of immediate devaluation, but the influen-
tad fiat Minister of the Treasury opposed any such move. On November 29
ng (Tuesday). President Lleras went on television to announce the breakdown of
ier the negotiations with foreign lending agencies, the elimination of the free
of market rate, and the imposition of rigorous import and exchange controls.
Devaluation was out of the question. The import liberalization program had
•nal lasted slightly more than one year. Before attempting to draw lessons from
m- this episode and its spectacular end, it is important to review what followed.
-•iOt
ird SISYPHUS AND LAW 444
:he
)flS The energetic preparation of a new comprehensive law on foreign trade and
er payments began about a month after the dramatic presidential announcement.
ing Discreet contacts were also re-established with foreign creditors. On the
iry tatter front, foreign personalities more diplomatic than those who had con-
ducted earlier negotiations, drawn particularly from the IBRD, began an
ian important role as "honest brokers" between the Colombian government and
or- the international lending group.
bt, The preparation of what eventually became Decree Law 444ofMarch 22,
ed 1967, absorbed most of the creative forces of the Lleras administration
to starting in December 1966. The new law codified and rationalized existing
iat regulations and practices in the field of foreign trade and payments, and made
be a number of important innovations, as noted in Chapter 1. The more flexible
ual exchange-rate policy, which should not have been abandoned in 1958. was
m- reinstated. Very cautiously, moves toward import liberalization were started
•of once again, from square one. As of early 1974, however, the import adminis-
ks. trative regime, including both licensing and prior deposits, had not regained
icy the freedom reached in October 1966. Since 1967, a year when imports had to
iad be cut back drastically and the rate of growth of real GDP was below trend (at
ity 4.2 per cent), Colombia has experienced an expansion in production and
• exports which by 1974 was without parallel in duration in the post-World War
the II period. In the next chapter, I will explore the extent to which this remark-
-
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ably happy ending to the 1966 blowup was due to exogenous and endogenous
factors; here, it will be sufficient to state that the new policies, particularly the
crawling peg, by successfully breaking the stop-go cycles of earlier years,
deserve much of the credit for the performance.
It should nevertheless be pointed out that the new policy course, now
clear in retrospect, was not obviously foreseeable in March 1967 either by
Colombians or by the foreign lending agencies. Those agencies were appar-
ently caught off guard and embarrassed by the November 1966 Colombian
moves, which had a very favorable political impact within Colombia and
widespreadrepercussionsand acceptancethroughoutLatinAmerica.
Throughout December IBRD officials had active conversations with Colom-
bian representatives, and by February 1967 a new IMF mission was in
Colombia to negotiate a fresh standby agreement that was finally signed in
spite of the uncertainty regarding the paceatwhich the crawling peg was to be
moved. On this score President Lleras clearly won his argument and obtained
the resumption of aid without committing himself to a particular pace or timing
of depreciation.
Officially, the post-March 1967 Colombian exchange rate is supposed to
be the result of a reasonably free play of supply and demand, akin to "dirty
floating." In fact,itisa crawling peg set daily by the government via
associated banks. The peg is changed every few days. As noted in Chapter 4, (
theredoes not appear to have existed any rigid post-1967 formula for deter-
mining the pace of the crawl.
QUESTIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE 1965-66
LIBERALIZATION EPISODE AND ITS
AFTERMATH
As conventionally measured, the performance of the Colombian economy
since 1967 has been better than its average for the rest of the postwar period.
Could all that plusthebenefits of the import liberalization reached in October
1966 have been obtained by avoiding the November 1966 blowup? Assuming
that this is the case, and leaving until Chapter 8 the discussion of exactly how
much better performancewould have been under those circumstances, the
obvious question centers on the responsibility for the blowup.
With the help of hindsight, and of tables 2-9 and 4-8, it may be seen that
key exchange rates were overvalued during the third quarter of 1966 (unless
one wishes to argue that 1970 rates were undervalued).Thus,the PPP-EER
for minor exports was at that time 17.6 per cent below the 1970 average; it was
also below the averages registered for 1961, 1962, and 1965. The PPP-NER for
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TABLE7-6 is
Selected Colombian Annual Growth Rates, 1964—70
(per cent).
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Gross domestic product 6.2 3.6 5.4 4.2 6.1 6.4 6.7
Gross domestic fixed capital
formation 12.5—5.6 8.0 6.6 15.0 2.5 13.1
Manufacturing output 5.9 4.7 6.6 3.6 6.2 7.3 8.3
Registered minor exports 18.9 35.8 0.6 17.4 34.8 21.5 1.5
BCSTexports —11.3 32.4—11.3 56.227.3 2.7 —1.2
Manufactured exports 71.2 19.9 22.5 4.8 32.7 24.6—15.6
Miscellaneous minor exports 17.093.2—19.0—25.1 75.2 69.6 42.8
BCST =bananas,coffee, sugar, and tobacco.
SOURCE:Nationalaccounts data from BdIR-CN; they are in constant market prices. Minor export
data from Table 2-3: they are in dollar values at current prices.
imports in the third quarter of 1966 was 16.3 per cent below the 1970 average
and below the 1958—59 rates. As dollar prices for coffee and other Colombian
exports were, as claimed by the government, particularly weak during 1966
(see Table 2-5), the ex post case for declaring the 1966 exchange rates over-
valued is strengthened.
The issue of the timing of the needed devaluation, however, is something
else. Both political and economic considerations suggest the soundness of the
Lieras reluctance to devalue until monetary and fiscal instruments were well
under control. Foreign pressure to devalue during October and November
1966 was not only insensitive but also economically dangerous, given mone-
tary conditions. The latter had been made more explosive by the automatic
release of funds previously frozen by prior import deposits. During the first
half of 1966 this had been offset by the sharp increase in imports, but during
the second half it threatened to add substantially to monetary expansion.
Most observers now agree that by October 1966 stocks of imported goods
were bulging, and a downturn in imports (even at the existing exchange rate)
was imminent. A good share of the increase in imports during 1966 had been
motivated by a speculative desire to take advantage of a liberalization not
expected to last long. It can be plausibly argued that the maintenance of the
external credit flow for at least a few more months would have saved the
liberalization program and given the new Lieras administration time to pre-
pare a noninflationary setting for the needed gradual devaluations. The decline
in the GDP and manufacturing growth rates registered during 1967, as shown




















If that had been done, would the pace of devaluations after 1966 have
been as fast as that actually observed? Would the crawling peg have been
maintained? It would be pleasing.to answer these questions with a clear yes.
Yet serious doubts must remain. As noted earlier, President Lleras, who
participated in the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, had in 1960 called for
an end to a short-lived experiment with the crawling peg. Six years after
Decree Law 444 had been promulgated, in March 1973, former President
Lieras called for an end to or at least a slowdown in the creep of the crawling
peg as a way to fight inflation and eliminate excess profits in some exporting
activities benefiting from the world commodity boom.'3 It seems difficult to
argue that without the 1966—68 pressure of foreign creditors Colombian
exchange-rate policy, particularly the pace of devaluation, would have been
the same as that actually observed.
There are some fairly straightforward lessons from the 1965—66 Colom-
bian experience. A government that does not want to be caught between the
alternatives of being pushed around by public or private foreign creditors
(with good or bad will is irrelevant here) or instituting drastic trade and
payments policies it does not regard as desirable should avoid launching
import liberalization programs with low foreign-exchange reserves and a
commitment to a pegged import exchange rate.
The 1965—66 devaluation-plus-liberalization episode lasted little more
than a year, from September 1965 to November 1966. Nearly full liberalization
lasted about two months (September and October of 1966). It can be argued
that such time spans only show the transitional problems of the program and
few of its benefits. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, contrary to what some
of the most enthusiastic champions of liberalization have claimed in the past,
there was in 1966 a dramatic upsurge neither in minor exports, nor in invest-
ment, nor in over-all growth rates. As shown in Table 7-6, the 1966 GDP,
investment, and manufacturing growth rates were above postwar averages
(shown in Table 1-1), but below those registered in many subsequent years.
The somewhat erratic evidence on the then still thin flow of minor exports
indicates no dramatic response to liberalization, apart from the response to
changes in the effective exchange rate documented in Chapter 2.
It is also worth noting that a return to harsh import controls late in 1966
did not prevent substantial minor export expansion during 1967, 1968, and
1969. The Colombian experience indicates that drastic import liberalization is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for export growth.
The large output gains to be obtained by avoiding stop-go cycles, and the
need to coordinate foreign trade and payments policies with those in the fiscal
and monetary fields to avoid such cycles, are also lessons emerging from the
Colombian experiences of the l960s and early 1970s. And had the pesoAPPENDIX 209
exchange rate been kept flexible, as it was in 1957 and early 1958, andagain
since March 1967, the growth and balance-of-payments performance during
1958—68 would have been clearly better. But more on this in the next chapter.
Finally, it may be noted that the circumstances surrounding Colombian
or trade and payments policy during the 1960s were so unique as to make it
er difficult to link them neatly with the Bhagwati-Krueger phases. Devaluation,
nt stabilization, and import liberalization policies were all either carried out or
promised late in 1962 and in mid-1965; so those events can be clearly labeled
as Phase III episodes. The events of November 1966 through March 1967 just
to as clearly mark a return to Phase II. But the new phase started in March 1967
an is more difficult to define. Perhaps it is best characterized as a slow-motion
en Phase III, which has carried Colombia almost imperceptibly (growing like a






a The percentage changes used in the regressions of Table 7-1 are shown here in
tables 7-7 and 7-8. The sources of the basic variables are as follows:
,re 1. Cost-of-livingindex.Obtained from IMF-IFS, withoutfurther
on changes.
ed 2. Wholesale price index, withand withoutfoodstuffs. Obtained from
nd BdlR-RdBdlR, without further changes.
ne 3. Money plus quasi money. End-of-month data obtained from IMF-IFS.
Centered quarterly series were obtained by averaging four of these end-of-
4
st- month observations. The user should be warned that starting with the April
1974 issue of IMF-IFS, substantially revised monetary data appear for Colom-
•es bia.
4.Average import exchange rate. Obtained by dividing the value of
ts merchandise imports in pesos by their value in U.s. dollars. It corresponds to
to the rate shown in Table 4-8.
5. Average hourly wage rates in manufacturing. Refers to nominal wages
66 in manufacturing. Basic data from DANE-BME. There is a discontinuity in
nd the methodology used to report such average wage data in DANE publications
is of May 1962 or thereabouts. Where they overlap, the old series is about 14 per
• cent lower than the new one. That percentage was applied to earlier observa-
he tions to obtain a homogeneous series.
:al 6. Real supplies. Expressed at 1958 peso prices. Includes noncoffee
•he gross domestic agricultural product plus merchandise imports. The former
•SO series is available only annually, from the BdlR national accounts. It was210 THE 1965—66 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
TABLE 7-7
Quarterly Percentage Changes in Dependent Variables Used in Regressions Shown






























































































































SOURCE: See appendix to this chapter.
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simply divided by 4 to obtain quarterly estimates. Merchandise imports are
available quarterly, but quantity estimates are shaky. The quarterly series in
1958 pesos was obtained by multiplying the quarterly import data at current
dollarsby 7.06, the average import exchange rate for 1958. During 1958—69 the








1966 I 7.81 5.02 4.90
II 7.97 5.25 3.28
III — 1.34 0.45 3.08
IV 2.04 1.91 2.57
1967 1 2.67 1.44 1.78
II 3.25 1.58 1.95
III —0.63 1.58 2.06
IV 1.27 1.31 0.90
1968 I 2.50 1.60 1.47
II 2.44 2.93 1.72
III —1.19 0.17 0.48
IV 1.81 0.37 1.40
1969 I 2.37 1.64 2.53
II 6.47 3.25 2.96
III 1.95 1.23 2.32





PercentageChanges in Independent Variables Used in Regressions Shown
in Table 7-1, 19571—19691V
Money Plus Average Import
Quasi Money Exchange Rate Wage Rates Real Supplies
(yearly changes)(quarterly changes)(yearly changes)(yearly changes)
1957 I 12.33 0 25.32 —25.04
II 8.40 0.40 27.16 —22.83
III 14.95 112.35 39.29 —9.33
IV 6.25 7.69 34.83 —6.33
1958 1 7.30 12.89 23.23 15.95
II 5.79 14.66 20.39 3.40
III 8.33 —2.69 7.69 —15.67
IV 16.41 —1.66 5.83 —18.02
19591 14.27 —3.38 4.92 —10.52
II 16.06 11.21 8.07 6.17
III 13.87 —16.23 8.73 14.96
IV 12.64 0.16 12.60 9.28
1960 I 10.89 —0.16 12.50 20.74
II 6.26 3.75 10.45 12.89
III 8.85 0.90 20.44 10.72
IV 10.66 0 18.18 13.58
1961 I 12.00 0 20.14 0.05
II 16.25 0 18.92 6.37
III 17.17 0 10.91 1.16
IV 19.73 0 12.43 6.30 4
19621 23.23 0 12.14 12.82
II 20.09 0 14.77 2.77
III 15.79 0 15.85 8.14
IV 18.32 8.96 19.47 —8.61
1963 1 15.01 23.29 33.51 —16.01
II 13.73 0 44.06 —1.17
III 20.97 0 40.57 —2.11
IV 18.78 0 35.24 11.60
1964 I 24.58 0 22.01 21.80
II 31.43 0 11.68 6.31
III 25.52 0 11.75 8.19
IV 23.79 0 11.40 3.49
1965 I 19.75 0 10.44 —8.52
II 16.95 0 9.85 —4.70
III 17.54 4.11 11.11 —11.81





1. See Arnold C. Harberger, "The Dynamics of Inflation in Chile," in Carl Christ et a!., eds.,
Measurementin Economics: Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in Memory
of Yehuda Grunfeld (Stanford,Calif.: Stanford University Press,1963).For the Argentine case, the
method has also been applied by Adollo C. Diz, "Money and Prices in Argentina, 1935—62"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1966), and by me, most recently in Essayson the Econo,nic
History of the Argentine Republic (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1970), Essay 7. pp. 366-.
377.
2. See Alberto R. Musalem, Dinero,!nflación v Balanza de Pagos: La Evperiencia de
Colombia en/a Post-Guerra (Bogota:Talleres Grhficos del Banco de Ia Republica, 1971), Chapter
1!.
3. "Monetarist" is used here to refer to those who would explain variations in the price level
exclusively as a function of changes in the money supply. There is, of course, a neomonetarist
view which argues that devaluation of the exchange rate works onlyinsofaras it reduces the real
value of cash balances, which requires a devaluation-induced increase in the price level. The
neomonetarist view, however, typically assumes devaluation occurs from a position of equilibrium
in the balance of payments and neglects the case where devaluation is accompanied by relaxation
of import controls.
4. A purely numerical reason may be involved: data on the average import exchange rate for
those years are likely to exaggerate the abruptness of the real transition between the old rate of




























































































Sousce: See appendix to this chapter.
I214 THE1965—66LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
of1956—58mayhave also induced a restraint on the part of the importing community difficult to
obtainunder more normalandless euphoric circumstances. (r
5. Thebanquet at the Tequendama Hotel, sponsored by the Economic Society of Friends of
the Country, where the Lleras-Agudelo exchange took place, was fully reported in the issue of
April 5,1960,ofElTiempoofBogota. Quotations in the text are from this source; translations are
mine.
6. Data on general government current expenditures, public fixed capital formation, and
GNP were obtained from the national accounts published by BdIR. AU basic data were expressed
at current market prices. Data on banking credit and on the budget of the national government
were obtained from IMF-IFS, 1972 Supplement.
7. Between 1962 and 1963, output indices of some key foodstuffs fell much more than over-all
noncoffee rural output; the percentage figure for rice was —6.0; beans, —6.4; corn, —1.8:potatoes,
—34.2: and wheat, —44.5.
Given its importance in the diet of the Colombian masses, and its special import difficulties,
the decline in the potato output is particularly noteworthy. These figures suggest that the
construction of a more refined index of supplies, as suggested by Miguel Urrutia, may be
desirable. (Basic data are from BdIR, National Accounts.)
8. The Banco de Ia Repüblica apparently intervened somewhat in the free market until April
1965, after which date it withdrew almost totally. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the free
rate, generated by a thin market, was influenced not only by expectations and other usual factors
but also by special circumstances, particularly conditions in neighboring Venezuela. Unregistered
Colombo-Venezuelan transactions played an important role in the fluctuations of the free rate;
they still have great influence on the black-market rate. The free rate, eliminated in November
1966, acted as a safety valve for the import control system; generally, authorities looked the other c
wayif imports were financed through the free market. o
9.Some authorities justified strict licensing of capital goods imports with the curious argu-
ment that they would simply lead to higher demand for imported raw materials in the future. Some
observers thought that import restrictions weighed more heavily on capital goods than on raw
materials and even consumer goods during 1963 and 1964.
10.Law 7 of 1973 finally strengthened the power of the Junta Monetaria to punish banks
effectively for their failure to meet reserve requirements.
11. Output indices of key foodstuffs were as follows (with 1964 =100):
1965 1966 1965 1966 s
Rice 114 114 Potatoes 103 113
Beans 90 75 Wheat 125 169
Corn 90 92
12.Debt service ratios obtained from IBRD, AnAppraisalof the Development Program of
Colombia, ReportWH-119a, June 21, 1962, Annex I, p. 16; and IBRD-IDA, AnnualReport
variousissues. The1962 IBRD report contained the following judgment: "The present ratio of 12
percentisalready very high and a ratioof 15 percent must be considered unsafe,particularly in
view of the great uncertainties about the world coffee situation" (p. 16). The 1966 debt-service
ratio was the highest recorded during the 1960s.
13. As reported in ElTiempo, March23, 1973. It mustsaysomething about the Colombian
politicalsystem thatthe same ministers of the Treasury and Development who in 1960 received C
the Lleras criticism against exchange-rate flexibility were to receive the new criticism in 1973.The
onlydifference was that in 1973Agudelo Villa was Minister of Development whereas Rodrigo
Llorente, who in 1960 was Minister of Development, was in 1973 Minister of the Treasury.